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PUBLIC LAND WITHDRAWAL POLICY AND
THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 1, 1978, President Carter withdrew fifty-six million
acres of federal land in Alaska from the public domain.1 Under the authority of section 2 of the Antiquities Act of 1906,2 President Carter ordered this massive land withdrawal by presidential proclamations which
created fifteen Alaska national monuments. 3 The unprecedented scope of
this executive land withdrawal 4 invites an evaluation of the policy behind
public land withdrawals 5 and the vitality of the Antiquities Act as part of

that policy.
Public land withdrawal policy is of vital importance not only to Alaska,
but also to the other western states containing large areas of federally
owned land. 6 The pressures of an expanding population, an increasing
1. See Pres. Proc. Nos. 4611-4627, 3 C.F.R. 69-104 (1979), reprintedin 92 Stat.
(1978).
2. 16U.S.C.§431(1976).
3. President Carter's proclamations also enlarged two existing Alaska national monuments. See
note 114 infra. It should be noted that the Alaska national monuments created by President Carter
have recently been revoked by passage of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. See
note 112 infra.
4. Prior to President Carter's Alaska withdrawals, a total of approximately 12 million acres had
been withdrawn under the Antiquities Act in 72 years. R. LEE, THE ANTnQurriEs Acr oF 1906 97
(1970).
5. "Public land" can be defined as any land or interest in land owned by the United States. See
Public Land Law Review Commission Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 88-606, § 10, 78 Stat. 985 (1964)
(no longer in force due to the completion of the Commission's duties). When public land is "withdrawn," its use is restricted and the land is excluded from the operation of some or all of the general
land laws that authorize settlement, sale, location, or entry. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, § 1030), 43 U.S.C. § 17020) (1976).
6. The federal government owns a total of 34.1% of the United States' total land area. The heaviest concentrations of federal ownership are in the western states and Alaska as follows:
% of land owned
State
byfederal government
Alaska
98.5
Arizona
44.1
California
47.5
Colorado
37.3
Idaho
63.8
Montana
29.7
Nevada
87.7
New Mexico
33.2
Oregon
52.6
Utah
63.6
Washington
30.1
Wyoming
48.6
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demand for land and natural resources, and a growing interest in conservation make careful land-use planning essential. Which public lands will
be used to fulfill the nation's material needs and which will be withdrawn
for purposes of conservation concerns not only the states that have large
quantities of federal land, but all individuals who have an interest in the
current debate over resource development and environmental protection.
Whether the Antiquities Act is an appropriate vehicle for implementing
land withdrawal policy is a question that has been of particular importance to Alaska, but it is also important to other western states that are
7
vulnerable to executive withdrawals under the Act.
After setting forth a brief history of public land withdrawals, this comment analyzes the current statutory public land withdrawal scheme as expressed in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA) 8 and identifies the various policies underlying FLPMA. Next,
an examination of the Antiquities Act's legislative history, judicial interpretation, and use will show that the intended scope of the Act is quite
different from both its actual application by Presidents and its interpretation by courts. Evaluating the Act in light of the land withdrawal policies
expressed in FLPMA, this comment will conclude that use of the Antiquities Act is so inconsistent with those policies that the Act should be
repealed.
II.

PUBLIC LAND WITHDRAWAL POLICY

A.

A History of PublicLand Withdrawals

The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to "dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States." 9 During the early days of
the Republic, Congress delegated authority to the President to withdraw
public lands for military reservations, Indian trading posts, lighthouses,
and townsites. 10 Withdrawals of this type became so common that the
validity of the President's original statutory authority was never ques-

234
(100th ed. 1979) (1978 data).
7. As recently as January 198 1, land in the State of Washington was considered for withdrawal
under the Antiquities Act. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 6, 1981, at AI, col. I ("Make St. Helens a
National Monument, Andrus Asks"). See notes 157 & 158 and accompanying text infra.
8. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976).
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See also note 14 infra.
10.
C. WHEATLEY, STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN LANDS 2
(1968).
BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
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tioned. 11 During the later part of the nineteenth century, Congress itself
began making major land withdrawals, but continued to delegate authority to the President to withdraw land for specific purposes. 12
On September 27, 1909, in the absence of any statutory authority,
President Taft withdrew three million acres of land in California and Wyoming from oil excavation authorized by the mining laws. In the famous
case of United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 13 the Supreme Court upheld the
President's action on the basis of implied congressional acquiescence to
14
such withdrawals.
15
In 1910 Congress enacted the General Withdrawal Act (Pickett Act)
in response to continued doubt concerning the President's nonstatutory
authority to make Midwest Oil-type withdrawals. 16 Under the Pickett
Act, Congress delegated to the President general authority to make temporary land withdrawals that would remain in force until revoked either
by the President or by Congress. 17 Even with passage of the Pickett Act
and the Supreme Court's ruling in Midwest Oil, however, the scope of the
President's authority to make permanent land withdrawals remained unclear. In 1942, the President delegated whatever authority he possessed to
withdraw public lands to the Secretary of the Interior, who has continually made extensive land withdrawals. 18
During the early 1960's, several bills designed to limit executive withdrawal authority were submitted to Congress. In response to these proposals, in 1974 Congress established the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) to study existing laws and procedures relating to the
administration of public lands. 19 Congress accepted the PLLRC's recommendation 20 that legislation clarifying land withdrawal authority was nec11. Id.
12. Id. at 2-3. The Antiquities Act is one of several statutes enacted during this period that
delegates specific withdrawal authority to the President. Other enactments included the National Forest Act of 1891 (authorizing the President to withdraw public lands for national forests) and the
Reclamation Act of 1902 (authorizing the President to make withdrawals for reclamation projects).
C. WHEATLEY, supranote 10, at 3.
13. 236U.S.459 (1915).
14. Id. at 475. The Court expressly refused, however, to find that the President possessed power
under the Constitution, independent of express or implied authorization by Congress, to withdraw
public lands. Id. at 474.
15. Pickett Act, ch. 421, § 1, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976).
16. C. WHEATLEY, supranote 10, at 4.
17. Id.

18. Id. at 5-6.
19. Public Land Law Review Commission Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 88-606, § 4, 78 Stat. 983
(1964) (no longer in force due to the completion of the Commission's duties).
20. Concerning land withdrawals, the PLLRC recommended that:
Congress assert its constitutional authority by enacting legislation reserving unto itself exclusive
authority to withdraw or otherwise set aside public lands for specified limited-purpose uses and
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essary by enacting the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA).21
B.

FLPMA'sPublic Land WithdrawalProvisions

FLPMA is a comprehensive piece of legislation aimed at modernizing
the entire system of public land laws. 22 One of its major goals was to
23
restore public land withdrawal authority to Congress. Section 704(a)
expressly repealed all or part of twenty-nine statutes that gave the President authority to create, modify, or terminate public land withdrawals.
Furthermore, that section clearly revoked any implied executive with24
drawal authority, thereby overruling UnitedStates v. Midwest Oil Co.
FLPMA prohibits the executive from making any withdrawal "which

delineating specific delegation of authority to the Executive as to the types of withdrawals and
set asides that may be effected without legislative action.
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OFTHE NATION'S LAND 2 (1970).
21. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976). Section 102, the congressional declaration of policy, states
in part that "Congress exercise its constitutional authority to withdraw or otherwise designate or
dedicate Federal lands for specified purposes and that Congress delineate the extent to which the
Executive may withdraw lands without legislation." Id. at § 1701 (a)(4).
Concerning the importance of FLPMA generally, as significant public lands legislation, see Symposium, The FederalLand Policy and ManagementAct of 1976, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 271 (1979); Public
Land Law Symposium, 54 DEN. L.J. 383 (1977).
22. H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6175, 6175-76. In recommending the enactment of FLPMA, the House committee noted:
From the beginnings of the Republic, the public lands have played a key role in the development of the economy and institutions of the United States. In directing the role that the public
lands have played, the Congress has enacted thousands of public land laws. More than 3,000
remain on the books today. These laws represented and effectuated Congressional policies
needed when they were passed. Many of them are still viable and applicable today under present
conditions. However, in many instances they are obsolete and, in total, do not add up to a
coherent expression of Congressional policies adequate for today's national goals.
Id.
For a complete compilation of legislative materials pertaining to FLPMA see SENATE COMMITTEE
ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL

LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 (Comm. Print 1978).
23. FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No.
94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976), reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEws 6175,
6183 ("With certain exceptions . .. [FLPMA]will repeal all existing law relating to executive authority to create, modify, and terminate withdrawals and reservations."). Four statutory provisions
that delegate withdrawal authority to the executive, among which was the Antiquities Act, were
intentionally deleted from § 704(a)'s list of repealed statutes. See note 71 and accompanying text
infra. The inconsistency created by FLPMA's failure to repeal the Antiquities Act is the subject of
Part IV of this comment.
24. 236 U.S. 459 (1915). Section 704(a) states: "Effective on and after the date of approval of
this Act, the implied authority of the President to make withdrawals and reservations resulting from
acquiescence of the Congress (U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co., 326 U.S. 459) and the following statutes
and parts of statutes are repealed." FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976).
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can be made only by Act of Congress." 2 5 Land withdrawals that require
an act of Congress include national forests, 26 national parks, 27 national
wild and scenic rivers, 28 national scenic trails, 29 national seashores, 30 and
wilderness areas. 3 1 In addition, Congress has exclusive power to with33
draw land for Indian reservations 32 and for certain defense purposes.
The policy underlying exclusive congressional withdrawal authority in
these areas is to "insure that the integrity of the great national resource
management systems will remain under the control of Congress.'
FLPMA delegates authority to the Secretary of the Interior to make
land withdrawals that do not require an act of Congress. 35 The delegation
is limited, however, by the provisions set forth in section 204.36 Under
section 204(b)(1), the Secretary must give notice in the FederalRegister
within thirty days after a withdrawal is proposed by the department or
'34

25. FLPMA, § 204(j), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(j) (1976). The House report states that FLPMA:
would reserve to the Congress the authority to create, modify, and terminate withdrawals for
national parks, national forests, the Wilderness System, Indian reservations, certain defense
withdrawals, and withdrawals for National Wild and Scenic Rivers, National Trails, and for
other "national" recreation units, such as National Recreation Areas and National Seashores.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6175, 6183. An act of Congress is not required to withdraw land for the National Wildlife
Refuge System. See 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(3)(A) (1976). E.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 9,562 (1980) (public
land order withdrawing land for placement in the National Wildlife Refuge System).
Section 204(j) also prohibits the Secretary from modifying or revoking (but not from making) any
withdrawal made under the Antiquities Act or under the National Wildlife Refuge System. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1714(j) (1976).
26. There is no particular statutory provision requiring an act of Congress to create national forests. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 471-538 (1976). However, Congress has frequently created national forests
by legislative enactment, see C. WHEATLEY, supra note 10, at 274, and § 704(a) of FLPMA expressly repealed the President's statutory authority to make land withdrawals for the national forest
system: See Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 348, § 9, 43 Stat. 655 (1924) (repealed in 1976 by FLPMA,
Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976)). Presumably, then, it is Congress' intention to
require legislative action to withdraw any land for the national forest system. See quoted language
from H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, supranote 25.
27. No statutory provision clearly provides that national parks are to be created solely by act of
Congress. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-20g (1976). However, Congress' exclusive authority to create national parks is well established. C. WHEATLEY, supranote 10, at 2 & 258-59.
28. See 16U.S.C. § 1273(1976).
29. See 16 U.S.C. § 1244 (1976).
30. There is no statute vesting exclusive power to create national seashore recreational areas in
Congress. However, all existing national seashores have been created exclusively by Congress. See
16 U.S.C. §§ 459-459(j) (1976).
31. See l6U.S.C. § 1131(1976).
32. See43 U.S.C. § 150(1976).
33. See43 U.S.C. §§ 155-158 (1976).
34. H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. &AD. NEws 6175, 6183.
35. FLPMA, §§ 204(a), (j), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1714(a), (j) (1976).
36. 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1976).
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requested by application. 37 This notice must specify the proposed withdrawal and the extent to which the land will be "segregated" 38 while the
withdrawal is under consideration. 39 In addition, the Secretary must provide an opportunity for a public hearing before a withdrawal can become
effective.40
Section 204(c) 4 1 provides for congressional review of any land withdrawal by the Secretary of 5,000 acres or more. The Secretary must notify both Houses of Congress of the withdrawal, and furnish information
42
on the land withdrawn, no later than the withdrawal's effective date.
Congress then has ninety days to veto the Secretary's action by adopting
"a concurrent resolution stating that such House does not approve the
withdrawal.' "43 Consideration of a veto can be expedited if the committee
to which the resolution has been referred has not reported it out at the end
of thirty days. 44 If Congress fails to veto the withdrawal, it remains effective for twenty years 45 and can be terminated sooner only by an act of
Congress.
FLPMA does not provide congressional review of land withdrawals of
less than 5,000 acres, 46 but the Secretary must still comply with the notice and hearing procedures. 4 7 If tracts of this size are withdrawn for "a

37. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b)(1) (1976).
38. The Secretary has the authority to segregate or exempt land from the normal operative land
laws while a land withdrawal is pending. Segregation becomes effective at the time of publication
and can last up to two years if not made inoperative sooner by rejection or completion of the proposed
withdrawal. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b)(1) (1976).
39. Id.
40. FLPMA, § 204(h), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(h) (1976).
41. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c) (1976).
42. Id.
43. FLPMA, § 204(c)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1976). This provision is ambiguous as to
whether both houses must adopt a resolution to veto the withdrawal or whether a resolution by one
house is sufficient. See Wheatley, Withdrawals Under the FederalLand Policy Management Act of
1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 311, 322-23 (1979). One commentator concludes that a concurrent resolution must be adopted by both houses of Congress to effectively veto the Secretary's withdrawal. Id.
But see H. CONF. REP. No.94-1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1976), reprintedin [19761 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6228, 6230 (referring to the "one-House veto provision"). It should be noted
that the constitutionality of such legislative veto provisions is questionable, but a full discussion of
this issue is beyond the scope of this comment. See generally Dixon, The CongressionalVeto and
Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 423 (1978).
44. The provision for expedition allows a motion for discharge to be made by an individual in
favor of vetoing the withdrawal. If the motion to discharge is passed, the resolution comes to the floor
and a motion to adopt a resolution disapproving the Secretary's withdrawal is properly before the
entire house. FLPMA, §204(c)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1976).
45. Id.
46. FLPMA, §204(d), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(d) (1976).
47. See FLPMA, §§ 204(b)(1), (h), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1714(b) (1), (h) (1976).
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resource use," ,48 the Secretary has unlimited discretion in determining the
duration of the withdrawal; 49 withdrawals for any other use are limited to
twenty years. 50 If the withdrawal is to preserve a tract for a specific use
then under consideration by Congress, the maximum duration is five
51
years. '
Finally, section 204(e) 52 sets forth a separate withdrawal procedure to
be followed if "an emergency situation exists and . . . extraordinary
measures must be taken to preserve values that would otherwise be lost."
Emergencies can be declared either by the Secretary or the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs of either the House or the Senate. 53 Emergency withdrawals are excluded from both the notice and the hearing pro54
visions, are effective immediately, and are not reviewable by Congress.
Even though Congress has no power to veto an emergency withdrawal,
within three months after the land has been withdrawn the Secretary
must furnish to Congress the same information that is required in the review process for tracts exceeding 5,000 acres. 55 Emergency withdrawals
have a limited duration of three years and may only be extended by giving
the notice required by section 204(b)(1) and by becoming subject to the
congressional veto provision if the withdrawal contains 5,000 acres or
more. 56
Section 204(f)57 provides that all withdrawals having a limited duration, whether made before or after FLPMA's effective date, must be re48. A "resource use" is not defined in the Act, but seems to refer to natural resource use as well
as recreational use and use through preservation of scenic value. See Wheatley, supra note 43, at
324.
49. FLPMA, § 204(d)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(d)(1) (1976).
50. FLPMA, § 204(d)(2), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(d)(2) (1976). Examples of land withdrawals that are
limited to 20 years include lands used for administrative sites, location of facilities, and other proprietary purposes. Id.
51. FLPMA, § 204(d)(3), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(d)(3) (1976).
52. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1976).
53. FLPMA, § 204(e), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1976). Even if the Secretary does not agree with the
committee's declaration of an emergency, he must make the withdrawal. Section 204(e) states:
"When the Secretary determines, or when the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of either the
House of Representatives or the Senate notifies the Secretary . . . the Secretary . . . shallimmediately make a withdrawal ....
.. Id. (emphasis added).
One commentator has taken a different interpretation of § 204(e), finding that a determination of an
emergency situation by either committee does not make withdrawal by the Secretary mandatory but
acts only as a strong recommendation. Wheatley, supra note 43, at 321. See also Alaska v. Carter,
462 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 & n.5 (D. Alaska 1978).
54. FLPMA, § 204(e), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1976). Notice of the emergency withdrawal must,
however, be filed immediately with the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in both houses. Id.
It is unclear whether this notice is required when the committee itself has compelled the emergency
withdrawal. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
55. FLPMA, § 204(e), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1976).
56. Id. A public hearing, however, is not required to extend an emergency withdrawal. See id.
57. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(f) (1976).
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viewed by the Secretary toward the end of the withdrawal period. Renewals of withdrawals of 5,000 acres or more are subject to congressional
veto but do not require a repeat of the public notice and hearing procedure. 58 The remaining provisions of section 204 deal with the statute's
retroactive effect on pending withdrawal applications 59 and on existing
land withdrawals. 60
C.

CongressionalPolicy UnderlyingFLPMA

The substantive provisions of section 204 serve five general congres61
sional policies.
Policy 1: Congress shall make and implement land withdrawalpolicy.
By repealing twenty-nine statutes that delegated withdrawal authority to
the executive and by overruling the implied delegation of UnitedStates v.
Midwest Oil Co., Congress clearly declared its intention to make and implement land withdrawal policy. Congressional control over land withdrawal policy was envisioned by the framers of the Constitution.62
Moreover, congressional control will lead to stable and consistent national planning. 63 In addition, policy developed by Congress is likely to
be more responsive to the public interest because members of Congress
are more accountable to the electorate than are officials in the executive
branch. 64
58. Id.
59. Section 204(g) deals with procedures for processing applications that existed at the time of
the statute's enactment. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(g) (1976). Section 204(k) appropriates money to process
those pending applications. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(k) (1976).
60. Section 204(l) provides for review of existing land withdrawals in certain enumerated western states. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(1) (1976).
61. Express statements by Congress on the policies behind the provisions of § 204 are lacking.
However, in enacting FLPMA Congress relied heavily on the report of the Public Land Law Review
Commission, which made recommendations for changes in the land withdrawal system and stated the
accompanying policies. See PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
LAND (1970).
62. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
63. The House report on FLPMA states: "The Executive Branch of the Government has tended
to fill in missing gaps in the law, not always in a manner consistent with a system balanced in the best
interests of all the people. A major weakness which has arisen under these circumstances is instability
of national policies." H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in [ 1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6175, 6175. See also Wheatley, supra note 43, at 327. In its report
the PLLRC also noted the negative affect of executive withdrawals on stable planning: "The...
study of withdrawals indicates that they have been used by the Executive in an uncontrolled and
haphazard manner." PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 43 (footnote omitted). See generally C. WHEATLEY, supra note 10, at 492-93.
64. Although the President is normally accountable to the public, it is not uncommon for lame
duck Presidents to make major land withdrawals. See note 134 and accompanying text infra. Moreover, officials in unresponsive administrative positions are typically the ones who make land with-

The Antiquities Act
Policy 2: In order to effectively make and implement land withdrawal
policy, Congress shall have the exclusive authority to make, modify, or
revoke land withdrawals that are part of the primary resource management systems. Congress reserved for itself sole authority to create national
forests, national parks, national wild and scenic rivers, national trails,
national seashores, and wilderness areas. Withdrawals made for these
management systems generally cover large areas and are restricted to a
single use or to compatible multiple uses. Congressional control over
these significant withdrawals is essential if Congress is to effectively
65
make and implement its policy and planning.
Policy 3: Congress shall delegate authority to the executive to make
land withdrawals that are not partof the primary resource management
systems; however, to ensure that Congress retains control over comprehensive land withdrawal policy and its implementation, executive withdrawals over 5,000 acres shall be subject to congressional review and
veto. Land withdrawals that are not part of the primary resource management systems are generally smaller and accompanied by less restrictive
use provisions. Because these withdrawals have a less significant impact
on comprehensive planning, it is administratively efficient to allow the
executive to study and initiate such withdrawals. 66 Congress' power to
review and veto any non-emergency withdrawal as small as 5,000 acres 67
drawal decisions. As decision-makers, members of Congress are directly accountable to their constituents. See also PuiBLc LAND LAW REviEW COMMISSION, supranote 61, at 2.
65. The PLLRC recommended congressional control over all significant land withdrawals, including those listed in the text: "[lI]arge scale limited or single use withdrawals of a permanent or
indefinite term should be accomplished only by act of Congress." PuBLiC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 54. The PLLRC also recommended that Congress be given exclusive
authority to create national monuments, national historic sites, national recreation areas, national
wildlife refuges, and other areas set aside for preservation or protection of natural phenomena or
wildlife. Id.
The House report on the National Wilderness Preservation System Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§
1131-1136 (1976), also noted the policies behind congressional control of the major land conservation systems:
A statutory framework for the preservation of wilderness would permit long-range planning
and assure that no future administrator could arbitrarily or capriciously either abolish wilderness
areas that should be retained or make wholesale designations of additional areas in which use
would be limited.
H. R. REP. No. 1538, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1964), reprintedin [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEwS 3615,3616-17.
66. See C. WHEATLEY, supranote 10, at 494.
67. Several members of Congress objected to congressional review of withdrawals as small as
5,000 acres, noting that 5,000 acres is very insignificant judging by land management standards in
Alaska and the western states where most of the public lands are located. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REc.
23,438 (1976), (remarks of Rep. Mink). However, in spite of suggestions to increase the acreage
threshold on non-reviewable withdrawals to 50,000 acres, see id. (amendment to the House bill offered by Rep. Mink), Congress adopted the low 5,000-acre provision.
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allows it to monitor any executive decision that could possibly affect the
68
overall congressional plan.

Policy 4: To ensurefull considerationof competing interests in the executive decision-making process, all non-emergency executive withdrawals shall be accompaniedby proceduralprotections. Congress' requirement of notice and a hearing for non-emergency executive
withdrawals ensures public participation in the decision-making process. 69 At a minimum, public participation is necessary so that citizens
will feel that their views have been heard. Ordinarily, hearings will also
produce information that will aid in better, more rational decisions. In
addition, because land withdrawals may have a substantial impact on individuals actually using the designated land, procedural protection may
70
be essential as a matter of constitutional right.
Policy 5: If emergency land withdrawalsare necessary, some congressional control shall be sacrificed to allow immediate action. Congress
realized that the executive branch is better equipped to take emergency
measures than the legislative. Therefore, it enacted FLPMA's emergency
withdrawal provision as an escape valve through which the executive can
withdraw lands that require immediate protection without compliance
with cumbersome procedures. Although the executive is given broad authority in this area, Congress retained some control over emergency actions by establishing a three-year durational limit on such withdrawals.
FLPMA's emergency provision thus effectively balances the need for immediate protection with the policy of congressional control over land
withdrawal decisions.
Although FLPMA repealed all or part of twenty-nine statutes that delegated public land withdrawal authority to the President, section 2 of the
Antiquities Act was absent from FLPMA's list of repealed statutes. In a
single sentence, without any explanation, the House report states that the
68. The provision of FLPMA requiring the Secretary to submit to Congress detailed factual information on the proposed withdrawal is especially designed to enable Congress to evaluate the proposed withdrawal in light of basic policy objectives. Wheatley, supra note 43, at 323.
69. The PLLRC made the following finding:
Based on our study, however, we find that, generally, areas set aside by executive action as
national forests, national monuments, and for other purposes have not had adequate study and
there has not been proper consultation with people affected or with the units of local government
in the vicinity, particularly as to precise boundaries.
PUBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 1. Furthermore, the PLLRC stated:
We believe that the expression of multiple views and interests and their impact on Federal
land use plans is fundamental to a democratic and meaningful planning process. It is essential to
provide a direct avenue for citizen participation in the planning process, through the use of both
public hearings and citizen advisory boards.
Id. at 57.
70. See notes 144-49 and accompanying text infra.
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Antiquities Act is an exception to FLPMA's sweeping repeal of executive
authority. 7 1 This exception seems unwarranted given the comprehensiveness of FLPMA's withdrawal provision and Congress' clear intent to con72
trol land withdrawal decisions. Moreover, as this comment will discuss,
the Antiquities Act conflicts badly with the five general policies underlying FLPMA. Before any comparison can be made, however, the history
and interpretation of the Antiquities Act must be more closely examined.
II.
A.

THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
The AntiquitiesAct andIts LegislativeHistory

Section 2 of the Antiquities Act of 190673 delegates broad authority to
the President to create national monuments:
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated
upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States
to be national monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land,
the limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected. 74
It is quite clear that the original purpose of the Antiquities Act, as its
name suggests, was to protect objects of antiquity. 75 The substance of the
Act was developed over a period of six and a half years in response to
71. H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6175, 6203. The House report states:
The main authority used by the Executive to make withdrawals is the "implied" authority of
the President recognized by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co. (236 U.S. 459). The
bill would repeal this authority and, with certain exceptions, all identified withdrawal authority
granted to the President or the Secretary of the Interior. The exceptions, which are not repealed,
are containedin the AntiquitiesAct (nationalmonuments), Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(native and public-interest withdrawals), the Defense Withdrawal Act of 1958, and Taylor Grazing Act (grazing districts).
Id. (emphasis added).
72. See PartIV infra.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976). In referring to the Antiquities Act throughout this comment, the
author is referring only to § 2 of the Act. The Antiquities Act also contains two other sections, see
note 75 infra, but these provisions do not deal with public land withdrawal.
74. 16U.S.C. §431(1976).
75. "Antiquities" are defined as "relics of monuments of ancient times." WEBSTER's THIRD
NEw INTEATIONAL DICIONARY (1961). See H.R. REP. No. 2224, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-8
(1906); S. REP. No. 3797, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1906).
Consideration of the three sections of the Antiquities Act in parimateria also compels the conclusion that the purpose of the Act was to protect objects of antiquity. Section 1 imposes a fine or
possible imprisonment on a person who "shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any historic
or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity ....
" Antiquities Act of 1906, ch.
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lobbying by archeological organizations. 76 Although the archeologists
limited the scope of their proposals to preservation of aboriginal antiquities located on federal lands, 77 the Department of Interior repeatedly proposed adding scenic and scientific resources as objects worthy of protection. 78 For six years Congress rejected attempts to include this broad
executive authority in any antiquities legislation. 79 Congress was unable
to pass the more limited archeologists' proposals, however, because of
bureaucratic delays and disagreements between museums and universities
seeking authority to excavate ruins on public lands. 80
The bill finally enacted in 1906 was drafted by Edgar Lee Hewett, a
prominent archeologist. 81 Hewett was concerned primarily with protecting prehistoric antiquities, but, at some point, he was persuaded by government officials to broaden his draft to include the phrase "other objects
of historic or scientific interest." 82 This clause allowed the broad delegation originally proposed by the Department of Interior, and previously
rejected by Congress, to slip back into the bill. Moreover, while earlier
proposals limited reservations to 320 and 640 acres,83 Hewett's draft allowed the limits of national monuments to be set according to "the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to
be protected.' '84 Despite the presence of this broad language in the Act,
Congress nevertheless intended to limit the creation of national monu85
ments to small reservations surrounding specific "objects."
3060, § 1, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976)). Section 3 allows for
permits for "the examination of ruins, the excavation of archaeological sites, and the gathering of
objects of antiquity ...
" Antiquities Act of 1906, ch. 3060, § 3, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (current
version at 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1976)).
76. See generally R. LEE, THE ANTIQumEs AcrOF 1906 47-77 (1970).
77. Id. at 59-62.
78. Id. at 52-55, 66 n.109.
79. Id. at 55-56, 67.
80. Id. at 60-64.
81. Id. at 70-73.
82. Id. at 74.
83. Id. at 56, 66-67, 75.
84. Id. at73,75.
85. The House report states:
There are scattered throughout the Southwest quite a large number of very interesting ruins.
Many of these ruins are upon the public lands, and the most of them are upon lands of but little
present value. The bill proposes to create small reservations reserving only so much land as may
be absolutely necessary for the preservation of these interesting relics of prehistoric times.
H.R. REP. No. 2224, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1906) (emphasis added).
Shortly after the Antiquities Act was signed into law, Congress passed a bill which created Mesa
Verde National Park. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3607, §§ 1-2, 34 Stat. 616 (1906) (current version at
16 U.S.C. §§ 111-112 (1976)). This bill was enacted to protect spectacular cliff dwellings in Colorado and covered a land area of 216,960 acres. R. LEE, supra note 76, at 78-80. One commentator
has speculated that Mesa Verde may have been given special treatment as a national park, instead of
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B.

Executive WithdrawalsMade Under the Authority of the Antiquities
Act

Notwithstanding the original purpose of the Antiquities Act, the language of the statute was sufficiently broad and ambiguous to allow, and
indeed to encourage, broad statutory construction by Presidents. Since
1906, Presidents have used the "other objects of historic or scientific interest" clause to expand the Act's scope, making broad land withdrawals
for scenic and general conservation purposes.
1.

AntiquitiesAct WithdrawalsPriorto 1978

Prior to President Carter's withdrawal of Alaska lands, eleven Presidents had created eighty-eight national monuments under the authority of
the Antiquities Act. 86 Of these, only thirty-seven can be classified as

being scheduled for preservation as a national monument under the Antiquities Act, because the
proposed area may have been thought to be too large to be made a national monument. Id. at 81.
Nothing in the Act authorizes the creation of national monuments for scenic purposes or for general
purposes of land conservation. Indeed, at the first National Park Conference, held at Yellowstone
National Park in 1911, Frank Bond, Chief Clerk of the General Land Office, made the following
statement concerning national monuments:
I have at times been somewhat embarrassed by requests of patriotic and public-spirited citizens
who have strongly supported applications to create national monuments out of scenery
alone . . . . The terms of the monument act [the Antiquities Act] do not specify scenery, nor
remotely refer to scenery as a possible raison d'Etre for a public reservation.
R. LEE, supra note 76, at 109, quoting F. Bond, The Administration of National Monuments, in
Proceedings of the National Park Conference held at Yellowstone National Park, September 11 and
12, 1911, 80-81 (1912).
86.
Years
President
# of monuments created
1906-09
T. Roosevelt
18
1909-11
Taft
10
1913-19
Wilson
13
1922-23
Harding
8
1923-25
Coolidge
13
1929-33
Hoover
9
1933-43
F. Roosevelt
11
1943
Truman
1
1956-61
Eisenhower
2
1961
Kennedy
2
1969
Johnson
1
Data compiled from tables in R. LEE, supranote 76, at 94-95 with two corrections supplied by the
author. See also 16 U.S.C.A. § 431 (1974). The above compilation includes ony national monuments createdby the President. However, Presidents have also been quite liberal in withdrawing land
under the Antiquities Act for the purpose of adding to existing national monuments. See, e.g., Pres.
Proc. No. 2372, 3 C.F.R. 134 (1938-1943 Compilation), reprintedin 54 Stat. 2669 (1939) (addition
of 2,760 acres to Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument by President Franklin Roosevelt).
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"historic.' 87 Acreage withdrawn has ranged from less than one acre to
create Cabrillo National Monument 88 to 1,882,998 acres to create Death
Valley National Monument. 89 Some of the presidential proclamations
creating national monuments specifically described the nature of the "object" provoking the withdrawal; 90 other proclamations referred only generally to "unusual features of scenic, scientific, and educational interest. ''91
President Theodore Roosevelt, the first President to exercise his au92
thority under the Act, set a precedent for creating both large monuments
and purely "scientific" monuments. 93 Presidents Taft, 94 Wilson, 95 Harding, 96 Coolidge, 97 Hoover, 98 Franklin Roosevelt, 99 and Lyndon Johnson 00 followed this precedent. There is little doubt that the scope of these
withdrawals is much wider than the framers of the Act originally intended.
Use of the Antiquities Act slowed measurably in 1943 after President
Franklin Roosevelt created Jackson Hole National Monument.' 0 1 The
87. R. LEE, supra note 76, at 94-95, with an addition supplied by the author. National monuments can generally be classified as "historic" if the land withdrawn contains historic landmarks or
objects of antiquity, or as "scientific" if the land contains no object of historical value and appears to
have been withdrawn under the Act's "other objects of historic or scientific interest" clause. See,
e.g., R. Lee, supranote 76, at 94-95.
88. Pres. Proc. No. 1255, 38 Stat. 1965 (1913).
89. Pres. Proc. No. 2027, 47 Stat. 2554 (1933); R. LEE, supra note 76, at 102.
90. See, e.g., Pres. Proc. No. 2860, 3 C.F.R. 34 (1949-1953 Compilation), reprinted in 64
Stat. A371 (1949) (Effigy Mounds National Monument, Iowa).
91. See, e.g., Pres. Proc. No. 2027, 47 Stat. 2554 (1933) (Death Valley National Monument,
California).
92. President Roosevelt withdrew 818,560 acres in early 1908 to create the Grand Canyon National Monument. Pres. Proc. No. [unavailable], 35 Stat. 2175 (1908); R. LEE, supra note 76, at 90.
93. President Roosevelt's first Antiquities Act withdrawal contained 1,153 acres surrounding
"the lofty and isolated rock" known as Devils Tower and is properly classified as a "scientific"
national monument. Pres. Proc. No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906).
94. Pres. Proc. No. 1126, 37 Stat. 1681 (1911) (Colorado National Monument, Colorado) (13.883 acres).
95. Pres. Proc. No. 1487, 40 Stat. 1855 (1918) (Katmai National Monument, Alaska) (1,088,000 acres).
96. Pres. Proc. No. [unavailable], 43 Stat. 1914 (1923) (Bryce Canyon National Monument,
Utah) (7,440 acres).
97. Pres. Proc. No. 1733, 43 Stat. 1988 (1925) (Glacier Bay National Monument, Alaska) (I,164,800 acres).
98. Pres. Proc. No. 2027, 47 Stat. 2554 (1933) (Death Valley National Monument, California)
(1,882,998 acres). See R. LEE, supra note 76, at 102.
99. Pres. Proc. No. 2193, 3 C.F.R. 36 (1936-1938 Compilation), reprinted in 50 Stat. 1760
(1936) (Joshua Tree National Monument, California) (825,340 acres).
100. Pres. Proc. No. 3889, 3 C.F.R. 390 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in 83 Stat. 924
(1969) (Marble Canyon National Monument, Arizona) (26,080 acres).
101. Pres. Proc. No. 2578, 3 C.F.R. 327 (1938-1943 Compilation), reprinted in 57 Stat. 731
(1943). Jackson Hole National Monument contained 221,610 acres. H.R. REP. No. 2910. 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950), reprintedin [1950] U.S. CODECONG. &AD. NEws 3746, 3747.
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Jackson Hole withdrawal was bitterly opposed both in Wyoming and in
Congress' 0 2 and was the subject of important litigation on the scope of the
President's power under the Act.103 Except for Effigy Mounds National
Monument,1 04 which was created from donated land, no significant additional monuments were proclaimed for the next eighteen years.1 05
In 1961, just two days before leaving office, President Eisenhower proclaimed the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal National Monument. 106 This
withdrawal revived strong opposition to the Antiquities Act, but Congress
took no action to restrict the President's power. 0 7 Except for two lowacreage withdrawals made by President Kennedy,108 no national monuments were established by presidential proclamation until January 20,
1969, the last day of President Johnson's administration. Upon leaving
office, President Johnson proclaimed the Marble Canyon National Monument in Arizona covering 26,000 acres' 09 and added a total of 358,000
acres to three existing monuments.1 1 0 President Johnson declined, however, to follow recommendations made to him to proclaim two new monuments in Alaska totalling 6,321,000 acres and one new national monument in Arizona embracing 911,700 acres.' 1 1 After President Johnson's
term, the Antiquities Act lay dormant until President Carter's massive
Alaska withdrawals nine years later.
2.

PresidentCarter's1978 Alaska Withdrawals"12
On December 1, 1978, in response to Congress' failure to adopt com-

102. R. LEE, supranote 76, at 98. See also C. WHEATLEY, supranote 10, at 261-62.
103. See note 126 and accompanying text infra.
104. Pres. Proc. No. 2860, 3 C.F.R. 34 (1949-1953 Compilation), reprintedin 64 Stat. A371
(1949).
105. In 1956 President Eisenhower did create Edison Laboratory National Monument in New
Jersey, but this withdrawal encompassed less than two acres. See Pres. Proc. No. 3148, 3 C.F.R. 86
(1954-1958 Compilation), reprintedin 70 Stat. C49 (1956).
106. Pres. Proc. No. 3391, 3 C.F.R. 110 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 75 Stat. 1023

(1961).
107. R. LEE, supranote 76, at 98.
108. President Kennedy established two national monuments in 1961. See Pres. Proc. No. 3413,
3 C.F.R. 124 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 75 Stat. 1058 (1961) (Russell Cave National
Monument, Alabama) (310 acres); Pres. Proc. No. 3443, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1959-1963 Compilation),
reprintedin 76 Stat. 1441 (1961) (Buck Island Reef National Monument, Virgin Islands) (850 acres).
109. Pres. Proc. No. 3889, 3 C.F.R. 390 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in 83 Stat. 924
(1969).
110. See Pres. Proc. No. 3887, 3 C.F.R. 385 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprintedin 83 Stat.
920 (1969) (addition of 48,943 acres to Arches National Monument); Pres. Proc. No. 3888, 3 C.F.R.
387 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprintedin 83 Stat. 922 (1969) (addition of 215,056 acres to Capitol
Reef National Monument); Pres. Proc. No. 3890, 3 C.F.R. 392 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted
in 83 Stat. 926 (1969) (addition of 94,547 acres to Katmai National Monument).
111. R. LEE, supranote 76, at 98-99.
112. An understanding of the history of Alaska public lands legislation is essential to the reader
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prehensive Alaska lands legislation, 113 President Carter used the Antiquities Act to create fifteen new Alaska national monuments and to enlarge
two existing withdrawals. The President's proclamations withdrew a total
of fifty-six million acres of Alaska land. 114 The state government, still in
the process of making its land selections as provided in the Statehood
of this comment. The saga of Alaska lands legislation began in 1971 when Congress enacted the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1627 (1976). Section 17(d)(2)
of ANCSA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw up to 80 million acres of federal land
in Alaska for study and possible inclusion in national conservation systems. 43 U.S.C. §
1616(d)(2)(A) (1976). Under ANCSA, the Secretary was to make recommendations to Congress with
respect to those lands and Congress was given up to five years to act on the Secretary's suggestions.
Id. § 1616(d)(2)(C) & (D). Thus, under the timetable established by ANCSA, if Congress failed to
act, all "d-2 withdrawals," as they came to be called, were to expire on December 18, 1978. See id.
In May of 1978 an Alaska lands bill finally passed the House of Representatives. See generally
DeStefano, The FederalLand Policy and Management Act and the State ofAlaska, 21 ARIZ. L. REv.
417, 418-19 (1979). However, largely because of the opposition of Alaska Senator Mike Gravel, in
October of 1978 the Senate adjourned without passing any legislation and without extending the d-2
withdrawals beyond December 17. See id. at 419. In order to avoid the opening of the soon-to-expire
d-2 withdrawals to mineral entry, and state selection, the Department of the Interior recommended
various administrative actions to preserve the status quo until the next congressional session, which
the Department hoped would produce Alaska lands legislation. Id.
In response to these recommendations, on November 16, 1978, Secretary of the Interior Cecil D.
Andrus withdrew 110 million acres of Alaska land under the authority of FLPMA's § 204(e) emergency withdrawal provision. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,756 (1978). Then, on December 1, President Carter
withdrew 56 million acres, most of which had been included in the Secretary's § 204(e) withdrawals,
under the authority of the Antiquities Act.
Even before these withdrawals had been made, the State of Alaska filed suit, alleging violations of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Alaska v. Carter, No. A78-291 (D. Alaska, filed
Oct. 30, 1978), [Pending Litigation] ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 65587. See note 142 infra. After the
national monuments were created the State amended its complaint to challenge the legality of both
President Carter's Antiquities Act withdrawals and Secretary Andrus' § 204(e) withdrawals. In a
separate action, Anaconda Copper Company filed a similar complaint. Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, No. A79-161 (D. Alaska, filed June 11, 1979).
For two years, citizens of Alaska were forced to comply with these massive executive withdrawals
while the pending legal challenges were repeatedly stayed in the hope that Congress would soon pass
comprehensive lands legislation, making legal rulings on § 204(e) and the Antiquities Act unnecessary. Finally, in November of 1980, Alaska lands legislation was sent to the President and, on December 2, 1980, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act was signed into law by President Carter. 16 WEEKLY COMP. oFPREs. Doc. 2755 (Dec. 8, 1980).
Section 1322 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act revokes all of President Carter's Antiquities Act withdrawals and Secretary Andrus' § 204(e) withdrawals in the face of congressional designations made in the Act. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No.
96-487, § 1322, 94 Stat. 2487 (1980) (to be codified in 16 U.S.C. § 3209). Thus, any lands withdrawn by the President or by the Secretary, which are not within a conservation unit established or
expanded by the Act, are returned to the public domain for use under the general land laws, or for
selection by the State under the Statehood Act. Passage of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act thus moots all litigation pertaining to use of the Antiquities Act or of FLPMA's emergency
withdrawal provision in Alaska.
113. See note 112 supra.
114. See Pres. Proc. Nos. 4611-4627, 3 C.F.R. 69-104 (1979), reprinted in 92 Stat.
(1978). The Alaska national monuments created by President Carter are:

The Antiquities Act
Act, 115 was outraged by President Carter's expansive use of the Antiquities Act and sought relief in federal court immediately. 116 In addition,
117
public outcry against this massive land "lock-up" was significant.
There is little doubt that President Carter was acting outside the spirit of
the Antiquities Act; the pattern of political events indicates that the President used the Act as a general conservation measure 1 8 rather than to
protect particular "objects of historic or scientific interest" as required by
the Act.
Compared to prior withdrawals under the Antiquities Act, President
Carter's actions were clearly unprecedented. In one day, President Carter
withdrew over four and a half times as much public land as the total land
withdrawn under the Antiquities Act by all prior Presidents in seventytwo years. 119 President Carter's proclamations cite "objects" such as "a
variety of landforms, including high mountain peaks and steep canyons,' 1 20 "extraordinarily deep and long fiords with sea cliffs,' 12 1 and
Name of National Monument
Total Acreage Withdrawn
Admiralty Island
1,100,000
Aniakchak
350,000
Becharof
1,200,000
Bering Land Bridge
2,590,000
Cape Krusenstem
560,000
Denali
3,890,000
Gates of the Arctic
8,220,000
Glacier Bay (enlargement)
550,000
Katmai (enlargement)
1,370,000
Kenai Fjords
570,000
Kobuk Valley
1,710,000
Lake Clark
2,500,000
Misty Fiords
2,285,000
Noatak
5,800,000
Wrangell-St. Elias
10,950,000
Yukon-Charley
1,720,000
Yukon Flats
10,600,000
115. When Alaska became a state in 1959, Congress gave the state 25 years to select 103,350,000 acres of land for state ownership. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, §§ 6(a)-6(b), 72
Stat. 339 (1958). Due to bureaucratic delays and legal problems involving conflicting land claims, as
of January 1979, only 23 million acres of the state's land selections had been transferred to the state.
See Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Mar. 9, 1979, C-12 (special supplement on the Alaska lands
issue).
116. See note 112 supra.
117. See Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Mar. 9, 1979, at C-7 (special supplement on the Alaska
lands issue). See note 156 infra.
118. See note 112supra.
119. Prior to President Carter's withdrawals, a total of approximately 12 million acres had been
withdrawn under the Antiquities Act. R. LaE, supranote 76, at 97.
120. Pres. Proc. No. 4625, 3 C.F.R. 98 (1979), reprintedin 92 Stat. (1978) (Wrangell-St.
Elias National Monument).
121. Pres. Proc. No. 4623, 3 C.F.R. 93 (1979), reprintedin 92 Stat. - (1978) (Misty Fiords
National Monument).
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"the largest and most complete example of an interior Alaskan solar
basin with its associated ecosystem." 1 22 These "objects" were, perhaps,
no more vague than the "objects" withdrawn by prior presidential proclamations. Considering the President's motive in making these withdrawals and the amount of acreage withdrawn, however, President Carter's use of the Antiquities Act was an alarming extension of a disfavored
statute already extended well beyond Congress' original intent.
C.

JudicialInterpretationof the Antiquities Act

By interpreting the Antiquities Act broadly, the judiciary has invited
sweeping executive application of the Act. The scope of the Antiquities
Act was first addressed in Cameron v. United States 123 in 1920. In Cameron, the government sought to enjoin a miner from occupying his claim
in the Grand Canyon National Monument, but the miner argued that the
monument should be disregarded as beyond the scope of the Antiquities
Act. 124 The Supreme Court disagreed and had little difficulty finding that
the Grand Canyon was "an object of unusual scientific interest" and thus
properly withdrawn. 125
In Wyoming v. Franke,126 the State of Wyoming challenged President
Franklin Roosevelt's creation of Jackson Hole National Monument. The
district court, finding the withdrawal to be within the Act's scope, engaged in only a limited review of the factual evidence and deferred to the
President's determination that the land withdrawn did contain "objects"
worthy of protection. 127 Although the court recognized the hardship and
122. Pres. Proc. No. 4627, 3 C.F.R. 102 (1979), reprinted in 92 Stat. -.. (1978) (Yukon Flats
National Monument).
123. 252 U.S. 450(1920).
124. Id. at 455-56.
125. Id. In United States v. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), the Court held that the Antiquities
Act does not restrict the President to protecting only archeological sites. Id. at 141-42. Although
Cappaertdealt primarily with the issue of rights to groundwater, the Court found that both a pool of
water and the endangered species of pupfish which inhabited the pool were "'objects" entitled to
protection under the Act. Id.
126. 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945). The State of Wyoming challenged President Franklin
Roosevelt's creation of Jackson Hole National Monument on three grounds: (I) that there were no
"objects" of historic or scientific interest included in the area withdrawn, (2) that the withdrawal was
not confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of a national
monument, and (3) that withdrawal of this land under the Antiquities Act was an attempt to 4'substitute . . . a National Monument for a National Park, the creation of which is within the sole province of the Congress." 58 F. Supp. at 892.
127. Id. at 894-96. The court stated: "Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any
person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts." Id.
at 896 (quoting Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 12, 19 (1827)). The court also deferred to the
executive on the issue whether the size of the withdrawal was excessive. 58 F. Supp. at 896.
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injustice imposed on the State of Wyoming by use of the Antiquities Act,
28
it stated that the appropriate remedy was in the legislature. 1
In Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus,12 9 one of the challenges to President Carter's Alaska withdrawals, the district court finally recognized that
there are limitations on the nature of objects and the acreage that can be
withdrawn under the Antiquities Act. 130 In addition, the court expressed
its frustration with the Supreme Court's failure to define those limitations. 13 1This suit, however, became moot before any significant decision
32
could be made. 1
Although the Antiquities Act was enacted in response to lobbying by
archeological interests, its vague language has led to sweeping executive
application. The judiciary, in acquiescing to broad executive use, has ignored the original intent of Congress and done little to limit the President's discretion. In enacting FLPMA, Congress purported to restore land
withdrawal authority to the legislature subject to limited delegations to
the executive, but Congress mysteriously failed to restrict the President's
broad authority under the Antiquities Act. Whatever Congress intended
by failing to repeal the Antiquities Act, the Alaska withdrawals focus renewed attention on the potential for abuse under the Act and bring into
question its continued existence. When the Antiquities Act is scrutinized
in light of the five policies underlying FLPMA, the inconsistencies between the Act and congressional policy are overwhelming.
IV.

THE ANTIQUITIES ACT AND CONGRESSIONAL
POLICY: INCONSISTENCIES AND VIOLATIONS

A.

Violations ofPolicy 1

The Antiquities Act violates FLPMA's basic scheme of vesting Congress with the authority to make and implement land withdrawal policy.
128. The court stated:
[I]f the Congress presumes to delegate its inherent authority to Executive Departments which exercise acquisitive proclivities not actually intended, the burden is on the Congress to pass such remedial legislation as may obviate any injustice brought about as the power and control over and disposition of government lands inherently rests in its legislative branch.
58 F. Supp. at 896. Indeed, the House Interior Committee subsequently held hearings and the President was criticized for exceeding the intended scope of the Antiquities Act, and in 1950 Congress
abolished the Jackson Hole National Monument and redesignated the land as part of the Grand Teton
National Park. C. WHEA'rLEY, supra note 10, at 262. See 16 U.S.C. § 406d-1 (1976).
129. No. A79-161 (D. Alaska, filed June 11, 1979). See note 112 supra.
130. Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, No. A79-161, at 2 (D. Alaska, June 26, 1980) (findings
of the court in partial motions for summary judgment) (dicta).
131. Id.at6-7.
132. The only issue decided by the court before passage of the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act mooted the suit, see note 112 supra, was whether the Antiquities Act should be
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As has been shown, Presidents have interpreted and applied the Antiquities Act broadly. 133 Congress' ability to control withdrawal policy is severely diminished by the vast land withdrawal authority potentially available to Presidents. Stability and consistency in national land-use planning
is desirable, and the congressional scheme can easily be upset by ex parte
presidential action under the Antiquities Act. Moreover, under the Act,
lame duck Presidents have withdrawn, and will continue to withdraw,
public lands at their discretion, remaining completely unaccountable to
the public. 134 To ensure that land withdrawals reflect public choice, all
major withdrawal decisions, including those made under the Antiquities
Act, should be made by Congress.
B.

Violations ofPolicy 2

Continued vitality of the Antiquities Act is inconsistent with the policy
of allowing only Congress to make withdrawals that are part of the prilimited to "historic landmarks" and "historic and prehistoric structures." Anaconda argued that the
phrase "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures" qualified the enlargement of authority contained in the "other objects of historic or scientific interest" clause. Anaconda Copper Co. v.
Andrus, No. A79-161, at 4 (D. Alaska, June 26, 1980) (findings of the court in partial motions for
summary judgment). Unsurprisingly, the court found, in response to motions for partial summary
judgment, that the President is not restricted to withdrawals of objects of antiquity under the Antiquities Act. Id. passim.
133. The Antiquities Act raises a classic delegation doctrine issue because it contains no standards and is accompanied by no procedural safeguards. Under traditional delegation doctrine theory.
if Congress fixes a sufficiently meaningful standard for the executive to follow, it has not made an
unconstitutional delegation of its legislative power. See Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 530 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418-19 (1935). The Antiquities Act
contains only a vague, standardless description of the President's power and no clear standards can be
found in prior legislation, the legislative history, or in executive application of the Act.
Since Schechter and PanamaRefining the Supreme Court has upheld broad delegations of legislative power even though standards were lacking, leading one scholar to conclude that procedural safeguards have replaced standards as the required element in delegations of legislative power. K. DAVIS,
I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 206-16 (1978). However, the Antiquities Act provides no
procedural protection to private parties affected by executive action under the Act. See notes 141 &
142 and accompanying text infra.
Although the current vitality of the delegation doctrine is suspect, see, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall, J., and Brennan, J., dissenting), the obvious frailties of the Antiquities Act present the particular kind of situation that would
support the doctrine's revival. See Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582-87 (1972) (suggesting that the delegation doctrine remains an important political check on the exercise of "unbounded, standardless discretion" by the executive). See also I K. DAVIS, supra, at 206.
Moreover, the delegation doctrine continues to be occasionally applied by state courts in natural
resources and environmental cases. See Rodgers, A HardLook at Vermont Yankee, 67 GEORGETOWN
L. J. 699, 702 (1979). In addition, the policies behind the delegation doctrine are reflected in the
firmly established theory that some natural resources are held in trust by government for public benefit, requiring courts to take a close look at action restricting public use. Id. at 702-03 & n.26.
134. Both Presidents Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson proclaimed national monuments in the
final days of their terms. See notes 106 & 109 and accompanying text supra. President Carter also
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mary resource management systems. Under the "other objects of historic
or scientific interest" clause, Presidents have created large national monuments for general purposes of land conservation and scenic preservation;
this was particularly obvious in the Alaska withdrawals. Although this
type of withdrawal is outside the original spirit of the Act as reflected in
the legislative history, courts have acquiesced in such uses of the Act.
Given the executive's broad discretion under the Antiquities Act, any
President can circumvent Congress' exclusive authority to create national
parks, national forests, and wilderness areas simply by classifying land as
a national monument under the Antiquities Act.135 The possibility of this
type of executive action makes it impossible for Congress to make and
implement land withdrawal policy by controlling large, significant withdrawals. By failing to repeal the Antiquities Act, while at the same time
asserting exclusive authority over the nation's primary resource management systems, Congress has taken an inconsistent and unmanageable position.
C. Violations ofPolicy 3
The Antiquities Act does not fit into FLPMA's scheme of limited executive withdrawal authority. Not only are withdrawals under the Antiquities Act usually large, but national monuments are normally adminis136
tered by the National Park Service in a highly restrictive manner.
Large, restrictive Antiquities Act withdrawals are likely to have a significant impact on Congress' comprehensive land-use planning scheme. 137
Because of this potential impact, the necessity of having Congress control
national monument withdrawals outweighs any administrative efficiency
gained in allowing the executive to make them.
The Antiquities Act is also inconsistent with Congress' decision to review and retain veto control over all executive withdrawals over 5,000
acres. The policy behind this provision was to establish a meaningful and
considered creating national monuments in the closing days of his administration. See note 157 and
accompanying text infra.
135. President Franklin Roosevelt's creation of Jackson Hole National Monument in the face of
congressional refusal to establish a national park is exemplary. See C. WHmFAT.Y, supra note 10, at
261, 464-65. In Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 896 (D.Wyo. 1945), the court upheld the
President's creation of the Jackson Hole monument in spite of the state's argument that the Presi-

dent's motive was to circumvent the congressional intent with respect to those lands.
136. See note 149 infra. Park Service regulations are among the most restrictive of all the departments and services which administer national conservation units.
137. One of the major concerns over President Carter's Alaska withdrawals was that the development of valuable natural resources needed to fulfill the country's energy needs would be blocked.
Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, March 9, 1979, at C-8, col. I (special supplement on the Alaska lands

issue).
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expeditious procedure for information submission and congressional veto
by concurrent resolution. Under the Antiquities Act, the President's
power is exclusive and land withdrawals are essentially non-reviewable. 138 It is true that Congress may revoke or modify the status of an
executively-created national monument.139 It is irrational, however, that
the procedure Congress must use to nullify significant withdrawals under
the Antiquities Act is far more difficult than the legislative veto procedure
provided by FLPMA for even small, insignificant executive with140
drawals.
D.

Violations of Policy 4

The single aspect of the Antiquities Act that is most inconsistent with
congressional policy is the absence of procedural protections. Under
FLPMA's withdrawal provisions, the Secretary of the Interior must publish notice in the Federal Register of all non-emergency withdrawals,
even if smaller than 5,000 acres, within thirty days after a withdrawal is
proposed. Moreover, before any withdrawal can become final, a public
hearing is required. In contrast, the President can proclaim a national
monument under the Antiquities Act without giving notice, providing an
opportunity for comment, 41' or even making an adequate study of the
proposed withdrawal.1 42 Presidents withdrawing land under the Antiqui-

138. One of the chief criticisms of the Antiquities Act has been that Presidents typically withdraw an area of land far in excess of the amount that is needed to properly administer the reserved
site. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 10, at 464-65.
139. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 652, 64 Stat. 405 (1950) (act of Congress
abolishing Wheeler National Monument, Colorado); Act of July If, 1956, Pub. L. No. 695, 70 Stat.
527 (1956) (act of Congress adding Zion National Monument to Zion National Park).
140. Of primary importance is the fact that the President can veto an act of Congress attempting
to abolish a national monument and Congress can override the veto only by a two-thirds vote of both
houses. Indeed, Congress was unsuccessful in its first attempt to abolish Jackson Hole National Monument because the bill was vetoed by the President. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 10, at 465. Withdrawals made under FLPMA can be revoked by either house by concurrent resolution without the
President's approval. See note 43 supra. In addition, concurrent resolutions do not require three
readings. F. RIDDICK, SENATE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 93-21, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 280 (1974).
141. The Antiquities Act makes no provision for procedural protection. See 16 U.S.C. § 431
(1976). The Act authorizes the President to make withdrawals "in his discretion" and requires only
that the lands to be withdrawn be "owned or controlled" by the federal government. If this prerequisite exists, declaration by public proclamation establishes the national monument. Id.
142. In Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (D. Alaska 1978), the court held that presidential actions under the Antiquities Act are not subject to the impact statement requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The court reasoned that NEPA applies only to "federal
agencies" and that because the President cannot delegate his authority to declare national monuments, the provisions of NEPA do not apply. The court rejected the State's argument that the President was advised by the Secretary of the Interior, thus creating the prerequisite agency action. Id. at
1160.
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ties Act may shun the public participation that is required for the well143
reasoned and fair decision-making favored by congressional policy.
Not only do the procedural inadequacies of the Antiquities Act violate
public policy, but use of the Act may violate protected constitutional
rights. 144 Under the general land laws, federal lands are usually open to a
wide range of uses including livestock grazing, 145 mining, 14 6 and hunting
and trapping. 14 7 Upon creation of a national monument under the Antiquities Act, depending on which department is given administrative responsibility, public land may be immediately withdrawn from these
uses. 148 Arguably, a person's expectation of continued use of the land is a
protected constitutional interest and the land cannot be closed to use until
some kind of hearing is provided. 149
143. See note 69 supra.The Public Land Law Review Commission also stated:
Public notice of proposed withdrawals and participation of the public and state and local governments, at least through invitation to comment and through hearings in appropriate cases, should
be assured.
Effective planning requires thoat [sic] all citizen interests have an opportunity to be heard and
considered . . . . Moreover, restriction on various kinds of uses can have a serious impact on
the regional economy. Consideration of these interests, along with others, should be mandatory
in the withdrawal process.
PUBLIC LAND LAW REviEw COMMISSION, supranote 61, at 55.
144. The question whether a remedy is available to one whose constitutional rights are violated
by the Antiquities Act is clouded by the subject of sovereign immunity and is beyond the scope of this
comment. See generally Freed, Executive Official Immunity for ConstitutionalViolations: An Analysis and a Critique,72 Nw. U.L. REv. 526 (1977).
145. See 43 C.F.R. § 4130.1-.7 (1979).
146. See generally 43 C.F.R. § 3810 (1979).
147. See generally 43 C.F.R. §§ 2400.0-3(j),-5() (1979).
148. See note 149 infra.
149. Consider the case of more than 1,500 commercial guides and trappers in Alaska whose
occupations involve harvesting wildlife on public lands. See Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, March 9,
1979, at C-10, col. I (special supplement on the Alaska lands issue). Prior to President Carter's
Antiquities Act withdrawals, these guides and trappers were free, under the general land laws, to hunt
and trap wildlife on federal lands. With the creation of the Alaska national monuments, however,
commercial (as opposed to subsistence) hunting and trapping immediately became an illegal activity
on all monuments placed under the administration of the National Park Service-because department
regulations prohibit hunting and trapping on national monument lands. 36 C.F.R. § 2.32 (1980). See
also 36 C.F.R. § 7.87(f) (1980) (interim regulations governing Alaska National Park Monuments);
44 Fed. Reg. 37,732, 37,735 (1979) (proposed rules for Alaska National Park Monuments).
It is arguable that the status of these professional outdoorsmen is deserving of constitutional protection. The same value which underlies the application of procedural guarantees when the status of the
welfare recipient is altered (Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970))-i.e., the protection of fundamental entitlements of livelihood from arbitrary government termination-is present when Alaska
guides and trappers are deprived of their entitlement to hunt and trap on federal lands. See also Reich,
The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733, 736 (1964) (discussing private use of public resources as part
of the government largess).
If Alaska guides and trappers have a constitutionally protected entitlement in their continued ability
to earn an income on federal land, procedural protection might be required as a matter of constitutional law, not to test disputed factual determinations, but to insure adequate consideration in the
executive decision-making process before fundamental entitlements are terminated. (Note that when
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Violations ofPolicy 5

The Antiquities Act's continued existence may upset the balance Congress struck in FLPMA's emergency withdrawal provision. By allowing
emergency executive withdrawals under section 204(e) of FLPMA, 150
Congress recognized that situations may arise where immediate withdrawal of land is necessary. Section 204(e) is sufficient to deal with all
emergency situations and preserves some congressional control over executive action by limiting emergency withdrawals to a period of three
years. However, emergency withdrawals, which should be made under
FLPMA, can easily be hidden under the guise of the Antiquities Act, thus
escaping the three-year limitation and circumventing the policy behind
section 204(e). President Carter's use of the Antiquities Act in Alaska is a
glaring example of such executive circumvention. 151
V.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Not only is the Antiquities Act inconsistent with congressional policies, but its very use raises serious constitutional questions. Moreover,
the Antiquities Act has been subject to increasingly broader executive application, and it is clear that its use today does not reflect the intention of
Congress terminates government entitlements, committee hearing procedures insure consideration of
differing views.)
Not only was notice and an opportunity to be heard inadequate in the initial creation of the Alaska
national monuments, cf. Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 1978) (State challenge to
closing of comment period on draft environmental supplement which considered several alternative
administrative actions proposed for dealing with federal land in Alaska), but Alaska hunters and
trappers were given no procedural protection subsequent to President Carter's proclamations. In rulemaking procedures after the creation of the Alaska national monuments, the Park Service declined
to consider comments on commercial hunting and trapping on the ground that -[ulnder existing law.
the Service has no authority to allow sport hunting or commercial trapping within the new Alaska
National Monuments." 44 Fed. Reg. 37,735 (1979). The Park Service's position is incorrect; there is
no statute preventing the Park Service from modifying its own hunting and trapping prohibition so
that Alaska's commercial guides and trappers could have continued their activities on national monument lands. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18(f) (1976).
150. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1976).
151. President Carter's use of the Antiquities Act in Alaska was prompted by the emergency
created by Congress' failure to pass Alaska lands legislation in late 1978. See note 112 supra.
Just two weeks prior to President Carter's use of the Antiquities Act, the Secretary of the Interior
did exercise his emergency withdrawal authority under § 204(e) of FLPMA. See note 112 supra. In
fact, much of the President's Antiquities Act withdrawals duplicated the Secretary's prior reservations. There are two explanations for President Carter's decision to use the Antiquities Act even
though the land in question had already been protected by the Secretary. First, the President was no
doubt aware that withdrawals made under the Antiquities Act may be permanent, whereas § 204(e)
withdrawals are effective only for three years. Second, in an attempt to avoid obvious overstepping of
his discretion under either provision, President Carter may have consciously chosen to divide his
withdrawals between the Antiquities Act and § 204(e).
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Congress in 1906. President Carter's use of the Act in Alaska epitomizes
the potential for executive abuse under the Act and illustrates how the
Antiquities Act defeats current land withdrawal policy.
The Antiquities Act should be repealed, 152 and Congress should reassert its exclusive power to create national monuments. 153 Although the
Antiquities Act currently lies dormant, three different groups have a
strong interest in seeing the Act repealed before it is again used to with-

draw public land.
First, the people of Alaska have a strong interest in seeking repeal to
protect their state from future arbitrary executive withdrawals. In the bat-

tie for Alaska lands legislation, the State of Alaska lobbied for a provision
that would allow federal withdrawals in Alaska to take place only by act
of Congress and not by executive or administrative act. 154 The Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act, passed in late 1980, makes no
such guarantee. 155 Repeal of the Antiquities Act would not only protect
further valuable Alaska land from being "locked up" at the whim of fu152. The author urges repeal of § 2 of the Antiquities Act. This comment does not extend to a
discussion of §§ 1 and 3 of the Act. See note 73 supra. In 1943, Congress considered proposed
legislation to repeal the Antiquities Act, but this legislation was unsuccessful. C. WHEATLEY, supra
note 10, at 465. By recommending that Congress be given exclusive authority to create national
monuments, the PLLRC also proposed repeal of the Antiquities Act. See note 65 supra.
153. Repeal of the Antiquities Act would take away the President's power to create national
monuments. Congress would retain its power to create national monuments by specific statutory enactment. See generally C. WHEAT.EY, supranote 10, at 259, 265.
154. This provision was commonly referred to as the" 'no more' clause" by state publications
and the media. Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Aug. 16, 1980, at 6-7 (paid advertisement by the State
of Alaska, Office of the Governor, D-2 Information Office). Insertion of a" 'no more' clause" in
Alaska lands legislation would have prevented any future use of the Antiquities Act in Alaska.
155. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act does not contain the state's proposed
'no more' clause" but contains what appears to be a compromise measure. Section 1326 states:
(a) No future executive branch action which withdraws more than five thousand acres, in the
aggregate, of public lands within the State of Alaska shall be effective except by compliance
with this subsection. To the extent authorized by existing law, the President or the Secretary
may withdraw public lands in the State of Alaska exceeding five thousand acres in the aggregate,
which withdrawal shall not become effective until notice is provided in the Federal Register and
to both Houses of Congress. Such withdrawal shall terminate unless Congress passes a joint
resolution of approval within one year after the notice of such withdrawal has been submitted to
Congress.
(b) No further studies of Federal lands in the State of Alaska for the single purpose of considering the establishment of a conservation system unit, national recreation area, national conservation area, or for related or similar purposes shall be conducted unless authorized by this Act or
further Act of Congress.
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 1326, 94 Stat.
2488 (1980) (to be codified in 16 U.S.C. § 3213).
Under this provision the Antiquities Act remains applicable to Alaska in a hybrid form. Because
executive withdrawals under the Antiquities Act are "authorized by existing law," the President may
still use the Antiquities Act to withdraw public lands in Alaska so long as the withdrawal exceeds five
thousand acres. However, under § 1326, Antiquities Act withdrawals would not become effective
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ture Presidents, but would be a good faith gesture toward a state that often
feels politically, as well as physically, isolated from decision-makers far
56
away in Washington. 1
Second, other western states with large areas of federally owned land
have a strong interest in seeing the Antiquities Act repealed to prevent its
future use. In the closing days of the Carter administration, the President
considered making substantial land withdrawals under the authority of the
Act. 157 Although the President failed to create any national monuments
before his term ended, 158 the fact that several monuments were under
consideration ought to alert western states to the possibility that they too
can be subject to uncontrolled, discretionary withdrawals under the Antiquities Act. 159
until notice is provided in the FederalRegister and to both houses of Congress. Furthermore, under §
1326, Antiquities Act withdrawals in Alaska are limited in duration to one year unless Congress
approves the withdrawal by joint resolution.
Thus, although the possible impact of the use of the Antiquities Act in Alaska has been lessened,
the President still has exclusive, unreviewable authority to withdraw Alaska public land under the
Antiquities Act for up to one year. On its face, § 1326 does not allow Congress to pass a joint
resolution disapproving an Antiquities Act withdrawal.
Subsection (b) probably does not protect Alaska from one-year Antiquities Act withdrawals because it prohibits only "further studies" and Antiquities Act withdrawals are made at the complete
discretion of the President. The Antiquities Act itself requires no study of proposed withdrawals, and
the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which require a study in the form
of an environmental impact statement (EIS), have been held not to apply to withdrawals under the
Antiquities Act. See note 142 supra.
156. The entire Alaska lands issue has sparked intense resentment and public protest in Alaska.
Many Alaskans feel that the federal government has broken the promises of the Alaska Statehood Act
which gave Alaska the right to select 103 million acres of federal land within 25 years. See generally
Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, March 9, 1979, § C, passim (special supplement on the Alaska lands
issue). Although 22 years have passed since statehood was granted, only about one-third of the 103
million acres of land promised to Alaska has been transferred to the state.
In November of 1980, Alaska voters established the Alaska Statehood Commission, an I l-member
commission whose executive director will earn a salary in excess of $70,000. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 13, 1981, at A4, col. 1. The Commission's purpose is to review the state's status with
the federal government and recommend possible changes, among which may be secession. Id.
157. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 31, 1980, at A3, col. 1. One of the withdrawals under consideration was a 213,000-acre or a 90,000-acre national monument in Washington state including
Mount St. Helens and part of the area destroyed by the mountain's May 18, 1980 eruption. Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 1, 1981, at C 1I,col. 3.
158. President Carter's decision not to create a national monument around Mount St. Helens may
have been influenced by the views of Weyerhaeuser, Burlington Northern, the U.S. Forest Service,
and the Washington State Department of Natural Resources, all of whom opposed creation of a national monument. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 18, 1981, at A12, col. 3 ("Plan For Volcano Preserve Attacked"); Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 1, 1981, at C11, col. 3.
Washington's senior member of Congress, Senator Henry M. Jackson, also opposed creation of a
national monument and wanted "to see the decision made in a much more methodical fashion, one
that involves the people of Washington state and the congressional delegation." Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 15, 1981, at C8, col. 2 ("Carter Won't OK Volcano Monument").
159. Only Wyoming is currently protected from use of the Antiquities Act. In 1950, after President Franklin Roosevelt's Jackson Hole withdrawal aroused bitter opposition to the Antiquities Act,
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Third, Congress itself has a stake in seeking repeal of the Antiquities
Act. As has been shown, the Act can be used to circumvent many of the
policies expressed in FLPMA. Moreover, the mere availability of this peculiar, antiquated withdrawal device makes a travesty of congressional
control of land withdrawal policy and undermines the effectiveness of
FLPMA. To prevent future Presidents from unilaterally creating national
monuments, and to achieve consistency with the spirit and policy underlying FLPMA, the Ninety-Seventh Congress would be well-advised to
repeal the Antiquities Act. The current political climate is favorable to
such legislation 160 and the present administration would be likely to support repeal. 161
RichardM. Johannsen

see note 102 and accompanying text supra, Congress specifically excluded Wyoming from future
application of the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1976) ("No further extension or establishment of national
monuments in Wyoming may be undertaken except by express authorization of Congress."). Concerning application of the Antiquities Act in Alaska after passage of the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act in 1980, see note 155 supra.
160. Many western states which contain large areas of federal land are currently demanding that
federal lands be turned over to the states for management. This movement has often been referred to
as the "Sagebrush Rebellion." See TIME, Dec. 15, 1980, at 30.
161. The Reagan administration has indicated that it favors loosening federal restrictions on public lands. See The Anchorage Times, March 8, 1981, at B-5, col. 1 ("Watt urges more access to
parks"). Because the Antiquities Act has been used by Presidents to restrict access to and use of
federal lands, the present administration could be expected to favor legislation to protect the states
from future potential executive abuse under the Act.

